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In Distributed Computer-Controlled Systems (DCCS), both real-
time and reliability requirements are of major concern. 
Architectures for DCCS must be designed considering the 
integration of processing nodes and the underlying 
communication infrastructure. Such integration must be provided 
by appropriate software support services. 
In this paper, an architecture for DCCS is presented, its structure 
is outlined, and the services provided by the support software are 
presented. These are considered in order to guarantee the real-
time and reliability requirements placed by current and fUture 
systems. 
1. Introduction 
Distributed Computer-Controlled Systems (DCCS) are increasingly used in the 
industrial environment, where computer systems are expected to perform correctly, 
even in the presence of faults. The traditional approach to guarantee the 
dependability requirements of DCCS is to replicate some of its components, in order 
to tolerate individual faults. However, when replicated components are used, there is 
the need for reliable and time-bounded communication services. Messages must be 
correctly and orderly delivered according to their timing requirements. Therefore, the 
full integration of the communication infrastructure with the processing nodes is 
required in order to obtain the desired level of confidence in the system. 
Using COTS as the systems' building blocks provides a cost-effective solution, 
and at the same time allows for an easy upgrade and maintenance of the system. 
However, as COTS hardware and software does not usually provide the confidence 
level required by reliable real-time applications, reliability requirements must be 
guaranteed by a software-based fault-tolerance approach. 
The use of COTS components usually implies the use of fail-uncontrolled 
components. It is not possible to guarantee fail-silent properties for off-the-shelf 
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hardware and/or software, as these components usually do not have the required self-
checking mechanisms for detecting faults. Fail-uncontrolled components require the 
use of active replication (Powell, 1994), since masking faults in one component 
requires the replication of such component in other nodes. Consequently, a COTS-
based system must be able to manage by its own such component replication. 
The proposed architecture is targeted to provide a guaranteed (timely and reliable) 
execution environment to hard real-time applications. In addition, it is also targeted 
to provide the adequate quality of service to soft real-time applications, which must 
not interfere with the behaviour of the hard real-time applications. It is not targeted 
to safety-critical systems, as these systems require a greater level of dependability 
and a more restricted set of failure assumptions (Laprie, 1992). 
2. System Architecture 
The system architecture (Figure 1) is based on the use of a set of processing nodes, 
where distributed hard real-time applications may execute. To ensure the desired 
level of reliability to hard real-time applications, specific components of these 
applications may be replicated. 
Figure 1. System architecture. 
Nodes are interconnected by a real-time network, which provides the 
communication infrastructure for the hard real-time applications (interconnecting 
controllers, sensors and actuators). This real-time network is also intended to support 
the replica management mechanisms. At the above level, as there is the need of 
interconnection with the upper levels of the DCCS (e.g. for remote access, remote 
supervision and/or remote management), there is a general-purpose network 
interconnecting some of the DCCS nodes. 
2. 1. Node Architecture 
Each node (Figure 2) integrates both a hard real-time subsystem (HRTS) and a soft 
real-time subsystem (SRTS). The goal of the HRTS is to provide a framework to 
support reliable hard real-time applications, which are at the core of the system. The 
SRTS provides the interface for the remote supervision management of the DCCS. 
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Figure 2. Node structure. 
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The communication mechanisms between both subsystems must guarantee that 
failures in the SRTS (less reliable) do not interfere with the HRTS (concerning its 
timing and reliability requirements). Therefore, mechanisms for memory partitioning 
must be provided, and the communication mechanisms must guarantee the integrity 
of data transferred from the SRTS to the HRTS, by upgrading its confidence level. 
The HRTS is responsible for providing a framework for reliable execution of hard 
real-time applications. Hence, applications have guaranteed execution resources, 
including processing power, memory and communication support. This claims for a 
separated real-time communication network for the HRTS, where messages sent 
from one node to another are received and processed in a bounded time interval. The 
HRTS Support Services are responsible for the real-time communication 
management and also provide a transparent framework for the replication of 
application components. 
The SRTS provides a set of services to support the supervision and management 
level of the DCCS. It may provide CORBAIHTTP servers, which can be accessed 
using supervision and management tools. At this system level, flexibility is a major 
goal, since new services can be created as the system is upgraded. 
2.2. Communication Infrastructure 
Current work is being performed in order to assess the suitability of the Controller 
Area Network (CAN) (ISO, 1993) to act as the real-time network. Although being 
originally designed for use within road vehicles, CAN is also being considered for 
the automated manufacturing and distributed process control environments (Zuberi 
and Shin, 1997). Several studies on how to guarantee the real-time requirements of 
messages in CAN networks are available (e.g. (Tindell et al. , 1995)). Nevertheless, 
the continuity of service is not fully guaranteed, since it may be disturbed by 
temporary periods of network inaccessibility (periods during which stations cannot 
communicate with each other, due to the existence of on-going error detection and 
recovery mechanisms). A study of the inaccessibility characteristics of CAN 
networks has been presented at (Rufino and Verfssimo, 1995), identifying the 
duration of its error detection and recovery periods. The integration of the 
inaccessibility studies with the timing analysis (Pinho et al., 2000a) indicate that 
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CAN presents some problems, as it is not able to provide different integrity levels to 
the supported applications. However, it is also perceived that, under an appropriate 
set of fault assumptions, it can be used to support reliable real-time DCCS (Pinho et 
al., 2000a). 
3. Hard Real-Time Subsystem 
The HRTS allows real-time applications to be distributed over the nodes of the 
system (Figure 3). It is based on the software integration of COTS components, that 
is, "replication handled entirely by software using off-the-shelf hardware" 
(Guerraoui and Schiper, 1997), rather than building software on top of specialised 
hardware. 
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Figure 3. HATS structure. 
The HRTS provides a framework to support hard real-time applications, where 
timing requirements are guaranteed through the use of current off-line schedulability 
analysis techniques (Response-Time Analysis (Audsley et al., 1993)). A multitasking 
environment is provided to support real-time applications, with services for task 
communication and synchronisation (including distribution). 
One hard real-time application is constituted by several tasks (processing units), 
which combined together perform the desired service. In Figure 4, a hard real-time 
application is divided in four tasks, which execute in different nodes of the HRTS. 
Each node has its own (non-distributed) COTS kernel and hardware, which provides 
the desired real-time multitasking support. An additional advantage of using both a 
COTS kernel and hardware is that it provides means for the easy upgradability and 
portability of the system. 
The goal of the HRTS support software (Figure 4) is to provide the distribution 
support (including both the application distribution and the replication management) 
to hard real-time applications. This module manages the communication between 
different nodes, resulting from the replica management, the application distribution 
and the interface with the controlled environment. 
The HRTS supports the active replication of software with dissimilar task sets in 
each node. The reason for allowing dissimilar task sets is twofold. By providing 
different execution environments in each node, the tolerance to design faults is 
increased, as the probability of the same fault occurring in more than one node 
decreases. At the same time, the architecture flexibility is increased, since nodes are 
not just duplicates, allowing for a more flexible design of real-time applications. 
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Figure 4. Distributed Hard Real-Time Application. 
However, multitasking applications with differentiated execution environments 
are likely to result in replicated components with non-deterministic executions. 
Hence, the HRTS support software provides mechanisms to guarantee deterministic 
execution. As these mechanisms need to be time-efficient, they are not based in 
replica co-ordination but in the concept of timed messages (Poledna et al., 2000). 
A layered approach is provided to the HRTS, in order to simplify the system 
development. The HRTS support software (Figure 5) EINBETTENcomprises two 
layers: 
1. The Communication Manager layer, which is responsible for the reliable and 
timely transfer of real-time data; 
2. The Replica Manager layer, which is responsible for the transparent 
management of the replicated components, in order to not burden the 
programmer with explicitly programming of replicate managing mechanisms. 
Applications Layer 
Figure 5. Hard Real-Time Subsystem layers. 
3. 1. Scheduling model 
HRTS 
suppon 
software 
The HRTS is intended to support one or more hard real-time applications. Each 
application consists of a set of related tasks (t1 •• • t 0), being each task a single 
processing unit. Tasks from the same application can be allocated to different nodes, 
(distributed environment). In order to use the well-known Response Time Analysis 
(Audsley et al, 1993), each task is released only by one invocation event, but can be 
released an unbounded number of times. A periodic task is released by the runtime 
(temporal invocation), while a sporadic task can be released either by another task or 
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by the environment. After being released, a task cannot suspend itself or be blocked 
while accessing remote data (external blocking). 
Tasks are allowed to communicate with each other either through shared data or 
by release event objects. Shared data objects are used for asynchronous data 
communication between tasks, while release event objects are used for the release of 
sporadic tasks. Tasks are designed as small processing units, which, in each 
invocation, read inputs; carry out the processing; and output the results. The goal is 
to minimise task interaction, in order to improve the schedulability analysis and 
increase the system's efficiency. 
As there is no synchronous interaction between tasks, the release of a task cannot 
be directly made by other tasks. Thus, sporadic tasks are suspended waiting in a 
release event object, which is triggered by waking tasks, whereas the runtime 
executive triggers periodic tasks. Internal blocking due to task communication can be 
bounded and off-line analysed using Priority Ceiling Protocols (Sha et al., 1990). 
3.2. Replication Model 
As there is the target of reliability through replication, it is important to devise which 
is the replication unit (that is, the smaller replication entity). Therefore, the notion of 
component is introduced. Applications are divided in components, each one being a 
set of tasks and resources that interact to perform a common job. The component can 
include tasks and resources from several nodes, or it can be located in just one node. 
In each node, several components may coexist. As an example, Figure 6 shows a 
real-time application with 4 tasks (t~> t 2, t 3 and t 4) divided in two different 
components. Component C1 encompasses tasks t 1 (node 1) and t 2 (node 2). Its 
replica encompasses tasks t 1' (node 3) and t 2' (node 5). Component C2 encompasses 
tasks t 3 (node 2) and t 4 (node 3), while its replica encompasses tasks t 3' (node 4) and 
t 4 ' (node 5). 
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Figure 6. Replicated Hard real-time application. 
A similar concept to the component can be found in the notion of "capsules" of 
the Delta-4 architecture (Powell, 1991). As the component, a Delta-4 "capsule" is the 
unit of replication, embodying a set of tasks (referred as threads) and objects. 
However, a "capsule" has its own thread scheduling and separated memory space, 
and is also the unit of distribution. Thus, the Delta-4 concept of "capsule" is more 
related to Unix processes, whilst the presented component is a more lightweight 
concept, which is used to structure replication units. 
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By creating components, it is possible to define the replication degree of specific 
parts of the application, according to its desired reliability level and the reliability of 
its components. The degree of replication of a component is referred as n-replicated 
component. In Figure 6, both components C1 and C2 are 2-replicated components. 
By replicating components, efficiency decreases as the number of tasks and 
messages increases and there is the need for agreement on the output of 
computations. Hence, it is possible to trade reliability for efficiency and vice-versa. 
Although efficiency should not be regarded as the goal of a reliable system, it can be 
increased by means of decreasing the degree of redundancy of more reliable 
components (if this assumption can be guaranteed). 
The component is the fault-containment unit. Faults in one task may produce the 
failure of the component. However, if a replica of the component fails, the 
application will not fail, since the output consolidation will mask the failed replica. 
Therefore, in the model of replication, the outputs of internal tasks (within a 
component) do not need to be agreed. The output consolidation is only needed when 
results are made available to other components or to the controlled system. As can be 
seen in Figure 7, several possibilities exist for the configuration of an application. 
The first part of the Figure shows the same configuration presented in Figure 6, 
while in the second part there is a solution where the application is divided in three 
components and only component C2 is replicated. The double arrows indicate 
communication between different components, thus communication needing 
consolidated data. 
( '; . 
Figure 7. Examples of application configuration. 
Note that the second solution is more efficient, as there are only two more tasks 
than the strictly needed by the application. However, the reliability assumption of 
both the sensor and components C1 and C3 (and the nodes where they execute) must 
be higher than in the previous solution, as they are not replicated. 
There is the need to guarantee that replicas execute deterministically, that is, 
replicated tasks execute with the same data and timing-related decisions are the same 
in each replica. This determinism can be achieved restricting the application from 
using timing non-deterministic mechanisms. However, the use of multitasking would 
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not be possible, since task synchronisation and communication mechanisms 
inherently lead to timing non-determinism. The use of timed messages (Poledna et 
al., 2000) allows a restricted model of multitasking to be used and at the same time 
eliminates the need for agreement between the internal tasks of each component. 
With timed messages, agreement is only needed to guarantee that all replicated 
components work with the same input values and that they all vote on the final 
output. The use of timed messages implies the use of appropriate clock 
synchronisation algorithms, since there is the need of clocks with a bounded 
difference. 
3.3. HRTS Replica Manager 
The goal of the Replica Manager layer is to provide hard real-time applications with 
the set of resources required for communication between distributed tasks and 
between replicated components. In the HRTS, tasks communicate with each other by 
using shared data and the release of event objects. However, these mechanisms must 
be different when they are used for intra-component communication or for inter-
component communication. In addition, there is also the difference when 
communication is due to distribution or it is due to the replication mechanisms. 
If precedence relations exist between tasks, the communication mechanisms can 
be simplified, since these precedence relations guarantee de:erministic execution 
(Wellings et al., 1998). If the receiving task is sporadic and is released by a sending 
task, it is guaranteed that, in all replicated components, the replicas of the task will 
execute with the same data. The same reasoning can be applied when the receiving 
task is periodic with a period related to the period of the sender task. 
Although the goal of the replica manager is to transparently manage distribution 
and replication, it is considered that a completely transparent use of these 
mechanisms may introduce unnecessary overheads, since there are some special 
cases that must be considered. Therefore, the application programmer (transparent 
approach) does not consider the use of components at the design phase. Later, in a 
configuration phase, the system engineer configures the components and its 
replication level and allocates the different tasks in the distributed system. In this 
phase, the communication streams that need timed messages are identified. 
Guidelines for splitting the application in components are to be developed to ease the 
job of engineers. 
3.4. HRTS Communication Manager 
The Communication Manager layer is responsible for providing a reliable and timely 
transfer of real-time data. The group communication abstraction is used as the 
framework for reliable communication and to support the replica management 
(Powell, 1994). In the replication model, a set of replicas from the same component 
is referred as a group. The Communication Manager must provide the following set 
of mechanisms: 
1. I-to-many communication, when a task of a non-replicated component 
wishes to disseminate its result to the n input tasks of a n-replicated 
component (reliable multicast protocol). 
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2. Many-to-1 communication, when an input task of a non-replicated component 
receives inputs from an-replicated component (consensus algorithm). 
3. Many-to-many communication, when a group of n output tasks of a 
n-replicated component disseminates its results to the n input tasks of a n-
replicated component (interactive consistency (Pease et al., 1980) algorithm). 
4. 1-to-1 communication, for communication between tasks of the same 
component (intra-component communication) or between the output task of a 
non-replicated component and the input task of a non-replicated component 
(no need for specific algorithms). 
The suitability of the CAN protocol for the communication infrastructure is being 
studied (Pinho et al., 2000a) (Pinho et al., 2000b). Although current results indicate 
that CAN presents some problems as it is not resilient to station errors, it is perceived 
that, with the appropriate set of fault assumptions, it can be used as the 
communication infrastructure. 
3.5. Interconnection with the outside world 
The interconnection of the HRTS with the SRTS must provide mechanisms for 
transfer of information between both subsystems. Communication from the HRTS to 
the SRTS does not present any major problem, since it is assumed that this 
information has a higher reliability level. However, if the output to the SRTS comes 
from replicated components, appropriate agreement must be performed. Conversely, 
the reliability of the data arriving from the SRTS must be increased, in order to 
prevent the introduction of erroneous values. Also, if the data is to be provided to 
replicated components, reliable communication algorithms must be used to 
disseminate this data. 
Interconnection with the controlled system is performed through the use of 
sensors and actuators. Sensor values can be treated as the output of non-replicated 
components and its dissemination must be performed accordingly to the desired 
reliability. The time at which the value is valid must be agreed upon. Output to 
actuators must also be agreed upon between different replicas. Such agreement may 
be made either in the computational system or the actuators may perform themselves 
this agreement, by mechanical or electronic voting on the result. 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper, an architecture for Distributed Computer-Controlled Systems (DCCS) 
is presented. It is targeted to provide a guaranteed (timely and reliable) execution 
environment to current and future systems. 
The structure of the architecture is presented, together with the guidelines used in 
its design, and its scheduling and replication models. The support software, which 
provides distribution support (including both the application distribution itself and 
the replication management) to hard real-time applications, is also discussed. 
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